ELEMENTARY SYMBOLIC LOGIC Necessity, possibility, equivalence, and consequence II

Reminder: The General Ideas

- *p* is necessary if and only if *p* must be true (i.e., could not be false).
- *p* is possible if and only if *p* could be true (i.e., is not forced to be false)
- q is a consequence of p if and only if q must be true (could not be false) whenever p is true.
- p and q are equivalent if and only if they must have the same truth value.

Varieties of Necessity, Possibility, Equivalence, and Consequence

Again: The above are fine, intuitive general formulae, but we would like to have a better sense of when a sentence <u>must</u> be true, or is forced to be false. What does the forcing? There are a number of different "background facts" that might play that role.

Type of N, P, E, & C	Tautological (Truth		First-Order		Logical		Tarski's World
	Table)						
	The truth functional	0	The TF	0	The TF	0	The TF connectives
Only pay attention to	(TF) connectives (¬, ^,		connectives		connectives	0	The quantifiers
the meanings of:	$\langle \rightarrow \leftrightarrow \rangle$	0	The quantifiers	0	The quantifiers	0	Identity
			(∀,∃)	0	Identity	0	All other predicates
		0	Identity (=)	0	All other	0	The particular quirks
					predicates		and features of Tarski's
							World
	Substitute sentence	Sub	ostitute nonsense			Te	World st out sentences and
Method for getting	Substitute sentence variables for atomics	Sub pre	ostitute nonsense edicates or		5555	Tes cor	World st out sentences and nsequence relations in TW.
Method for getting the right "level of	Substitute sentence variables for atomics and for quantifier	Sub pre pre	ostitute nonsense idicates or idicate letters for		???? Axiomatization?	Tes con (Os	World st out sentences and nsequence relations in TW. r axiomatize?)
Method for getting the right "level of attention":	Substitute sentence variables for atomics and for quantifier statements	Sub pre pre Eng	ostitute nonsense dicates or dicate letters for glish predicates		???? Axiomatization?	Tes con (O	World st out sentences and nsequence relations in TW. r axiomatize?)

Notice that as we move further to the right in this table, we get more and more stuff doing the "forcing"—layers upon layers of stuff that makes sentences turn out to be necessarily true. So what does that tell us about the relationship between the sets of necessary truths for each category? And what does that tell us about *possibility*, where having more stuff to force sentences to be true or false *reduces* possibility?